Abstract: Markets, hierarchies and networks are widely understood to be the three primary forms of social organization. In this article, we study the choice between these forms of social organization in a general, agent-based model (ABM) of cooperation. The organizational ecology is the product, an emergent property, of the set of choices made by agents contingent on their individual attributes and beliefs about the population of agents. This is, to our knowledge, one of the first attempts to theorize explicitly the choice between different organizational forms, especially networks and hierarchies, and certainly the first do so in an ABM. We apply the insights of our model to current research on transnational networks, social capital, and the sources of hierarchy and especially autocracy.
not included institutional or organizational features.
2 Although there are several computational models of organizations, most focus on intra-organizational attributes. 3 This is the first ABM to study the choice between organizational forms and organizational effects in a general model of cooperation.
The ABM reveals theoretical limitations and inconsistencies in existing theories, highlights interaction effects and population dynamics --thereby offering new explanations for phase shifts and other phenomenon absent from purely verbal and even formal models, and generates new theoretical insights. We apply the model to transnational networks and international governance, networks and social capital, and the sources of hierarchy. We find networks are useful only for actors with contingent strategies, such as tit-for-tat within a
Prisoner's Dilemma, who can learn from the knowledge of others and adjust their behavior accordingly. Actors with fixed strategies, like those in which the agent always defects or cooperates, do not join networks. In turn, in a static population with no exogenous changes in the attributes of agents, networks quickly become obsolete as agents acquire information about other agents. Networks are also fragile. Although preferred when network costs are low or the population is relatively small and "nice," the range of conditions in which networks are selected over markets and hierarchies is quite limited. Conversely, hierarchy is preferred in relatively "nastier" conditions with larger numbers of uncooperative and opportunistic agents.
Paradoxically, it is the most cooperative agents who first join hierarchies to reap the benefits of centralized enforcement when the population turns nasty. In many cases, population dynamics create phase shifts in which agents shift from one organization to another as a result of small changes in their environments.
These applications are not tests of our model in any degree. Indeed, our ABM is intended to be general and is not designed to capture issues specific to these literatures. Nonetheless, we believe the model clarifies propositions central to each and raises important new questions for research. We proceed by introducing our theoretical constructs and outlining the basic structure of the ABM. We then examine results of the model relevant to the three literatures.
I. Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks as Organizations
We focus on the generic problem of cooperation among self-seeking actors choosing between different organizational forms. By using simple, ideal type representations we aim to identify broad principles of organizational ecology that can be applied to an array of cooperation problems. For each organization, we distill the form to its essence as characterized in the existing literature. There are, no doubt, many hybrid forms in the real world, but to keep the analysis simple we focus only on ideal types.
The problem of cooperation is characterized here as an iterated two-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game (see Figure 1 ). As Axelrod (1984) and others have shown, such a model captures the essential features of a broad class of cooperation problems. In addition to this standard setup, however, we permit agents to have individual preferences defined by ideal points along a finite continuum. Our intuition is that mutual cooperation does not mean the same thing or carry the same value for all pairs of actors. Cooperation with an actor that shares one's preferences is different from cooperation with an actor with preferences distant from one's own.
Assuming that cooperation occurs at the median of their ideal points, two "left" actors, for instance, gain greater utility from cooperating with one another than might one "left" and one "right" actor. If cooperation means working together to promote a particular political cause, two left actors will pursue a cause closer to their preferences than would a left and right actor, for whom the median would be further from their ideal points. To anticipate a technical point below,
when actors both cooperate, we subtract the weighted spatial distance between their ideal points (k ij = w(|p i -p j |/2)) from the payoffs from mutual cooperation. In all cases, any weight on preferences greater than zero (w > 0) makes cooperation less likely as it reduces the value of mutual cooperation relative to other possible outcomes. As the weight on preferences increases, agents that might otherwise choose to cooperate will now choose to defect. The primary implication of this amendment to the standard PD game is that actors with more similar preferences will be more likely to cooperate than agents with more dissimilar preferences, all else considered.
Figure 1 About Here
We conceive of markets as arising between two anomic agents who cannot make binding promises and know only their own past interactions with each other. Markets are, in short, the organizational form implied in a standard PD game. 4 Cooperation is possible, but most likely between actors playing nice strategies or those that begin by cooperating with others. In this article, we treat markets largely as a default option and baseline against which other organizational forms are compared.
In the canonical definition, networks are governance structures characterized by "voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8; Podolny and Page 1998, 59 ). 5 Accordingly, we model networks here as mechanisms for acquiring information on agents from other agents with whom an agent has cooperated in the past. Intuitively, networks allow one agent, say i, to ask a defined number of agents with whom i has previously cooperated if they have played agent j, and if so what j did (cooperate or defect) and what is j's ideal point (p j ). With this information, agent i can then decide whether to cooperate or defect with j. Thus, networks provide information that 4 Markets might also be described as anarchy, in contradistinction to hierarchy. Markets in the real world are often embedded in a host of legal protections and constraints. We defer to the larger literature, however, in the use of the term "market." 5 Defined as a set of nodes (agents) and edges (interactions), almost any set of actors can be described as a network. Social network theory, in turn, has developed a host of tools and concepts for measuring and describing the structure of such networks (see Jackson 2008) . We treat networks more as governance structures, but focus on the information flows between agents common to both approaches. On the different conceptions and uses of networks in political science, see Kahler (2009). supplements the information i may have acquired through its own past interactions with j. The primary effect of information from the network is to prevent agents from being "suckered" in the first round of play with any new agent. In this conception, we focus on the information transmission function of networks. 6 Often treated as a defining attribute of networks, in our model reciprocity is an emergent property of the agents who tend to select themselves into networks (see Powell 1990, 303, and Podolny and Page 1998, 59) . Only agents that possess a contingent strategy (defined below) will ever choose to join a network, and having joined they will receive information from the other agents, update their knowledge of the particular agent they are paired with in this round of play, and play reciprocally.
Participating in a network is always costly, however, represented in the model as a variable fee (φ) subtracted from the agent's payoffs no matter the outcome of the game. This fee is intended to capture the transactions costs of networking, variously interpreted as the opportunity costs of providing information, engaging in activities intended to develop social capital, and sending costly signals of commitment to the group necessary to establish trust or reputation. Agents may join a network and gain information about other agents even if those other agents are themselves choosing a market or hierarchy. In such a case, the networked agent plays with the information acquired from past cooperators, but the other agent plays using only its private knowledge.
Third party enforcement stands at the core of all definitions of hierarchy. In our model, agents within the hierarchy cooperate with one another subject to punishments for defection. If an agent defects, it receives the temptation (T) payoff minus the punishment, while the other receives the sucker's payoff (S). 7 We treat both the probability of cooperation within the hierarchy (q) and the magnitude of the punishment (v) as exogenous. Our intuitive analogy is to agents working in a corporation and tasked to cooperate with their fellow employees, but cooperation within the firm is contingent on factors beyond the agent's control -including the state of the macroeconomy, fickle consumer tastes, a capricious boss, and so on. Some portion of the time, the agent's best efforts to cooperate may nonetheless appear to be a defection for which it is punished. This intuition extends to clans, states, autocracies, and many other hierarchies in which individuals are mandated to cooperate (uphold contracts) with one another and are punished by a central enforcer if they defect. Although random defection at an exogenously defined probability is somewhat crude, some such mechanism is necessary to prevent hierarchy from dominating all other organizational forms. 8 This representation also allows us to investigate how the probability of defection and levels of punishment affect the expected utility of cooperation under hierarchy.
A second key attribute of hierarchy is the ability of the third party -typically the ruler, leader, or boss-to command legitimately certain actions by the members of the organization. In the model, we represent this authority by assuming cooperation occurs at the hierarch's ideal point (p h ). Thus, payoffs for cooperation for agents in a hierarchical interaction are adjusted by the difference not between their individual preferences but between each agent's ideal point and that assigned for the hierarchy as a whole (k ih = w|p i -p h |). In this way, agents are understood to subordinate themselves to the preferences of the hierarch.
Agents in the hierarchy who interact with agents outside the same hierarchy play as in the market. Thus, cooperation is mandated and subject to centralized enforcement only with other members of one's own hierarchy or "group." In other words, the rule of law represented in cooperation at the hierarchy's ideal point and centralized punishment for defection does not apply "extra-territorially" or beyond the members of the same hierarchy.
III. Modeling Organizational Ecologies in an Agent-Based Framework
We describe the ABM here in its three stages: initialization, learning, and organizational choice. The expected utility equations for each organization, which lay at the heart of the model, are detailed in the Appendix.
Initialization
The model begins with the specification of 21 user-defined parameters. These parameters and their default values, used in all the simulations presented below unless otherwise specified, are listed in Table 1 . Payoffs for the various outcomes are set: T, R, P, and S. 9 The user defines the population of actors, specifically the distribution of strategy types, and their preferences. Like other gametheoretic ABMs, agents are defined by their strategy types. We focus on three basic strategies: all cooperate (ALLC), all defect (ALLD), and tit-for-tat (TFT). 10 ALLC and TFT are nice strategies that begin by cooperating with new agents, while ALLD is a nasty strategy. Below, we refer to nice and nasty populations as defined by the relative proportions of these two sets of agents.
Preferences (p i ) are defined over a [0,1] space and randomly assigned from a normal distribution.
The weight on preferences (w) can also be varied.
The organizational parameters are also set at this stage. Networks are defined by their width (α), the number of other agents each agent can directly ask about the agent it has been randomly paired with, and their depth (l), the number of levels of agents that are polled. A 3x3 (α 9 For all analysis here, we set cardinal payoffs to the PD game in Axelrod (1984) . These payoffs can be manipulated to create any 2x2 game. 10 We constructed the ABM with two additional agent types: anti-tit-for-tat (ATFT); and a mixed type that plays cooperation probabilistically at a specified rate (MIX). These types are less interesting theoretically than the other three. For simplicity, in all the simulations reported below we include only varying combinations of ALLC, TFT, and ALLD strategy types. Studying the effects of introducing ATFT and MIX types is left to the future.
= 3, l = 3) network is illustrated in Figure 2 . Although each agent has a potentially infinite memory of its own interactions with each other agent in the population, the network is limited to a fixed memory (m) defined by the number of previous rounds over which it can poll. That is, if memory is set at five, any agent can poll only those agents with whom it has cooperated in the last five rounds whether they have interacted with the other agent with whom it has been randomly paired in the current round. The longer the memory (the larger is m) for the network, the more useful information it returns to the agent. 11 The fee for joining the network (φ) is also set.
Figure 2 about here
A hierarchy is defined by its assigned ideal point (p h ), the probability that any agent will cooperate with other agents in the hierarchy (q), and the penalty that is imposed on agents for defecting on other agents in the hierarchy (v). All of these parameters are common knowledge.
Since the expected utility for joining the hierarchy is contingent on the number of other agents in the hierarchy (θ), in the first round of organizational play the user sets an "advertised" number of agents in the hierarchy, which need not be the same as the actual number of agents who join. In subsequent rounds, agents know the actual number of agents who joined the hierarchy in the previous round.
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Learning
Agents begin the simulation without any knowledge of the distribution of the other agents' strategies or the mean ideal point of agents in the population. In the learning phase, agents 11 In allowing an agent's own memory of past play and the network's "memory" to differ, we are essentially assuming that an individual's memory of others lasts longer than that individual's social interactions. This seems reasonable. Those of us who hold grudges and have only fleeting friendships typically remember others who have treated us badly in the past longer than we engage in sets of social relationships. This assumption is consequential only for the self-obsolescing nature of networks discussed below. If agent memory were limited to the same as the network memory, networks would remain more robust over more rounds of the game. Conversely, without this restriction on network memory, the network would return "too much" information in early rounds and become obsolete almost immediately. 12 We also have the ability to define up to three unique hierarchies. If multiple hierarchies are created, these four parameters are specified for each. In this paper, we limit all simulations to one hierarchy.
are randomly paired with other agents with whom they then play a round of the game according to their fixed strategy type with payoffs as specified. In this article, for simplicity, the number of rounds for the learning period is arbitrarily fixed at ten. 13 Each agent develops unique beliefs over the course of play, meaning that even agents with the same strategy type and even very similar or identical ideal points will make different organizational choices in the next stage. Agents who believe the population is nastier than it really is are pessimists and agents who believe the population is nicer than in actuality are optimists.
Organizational Choice and Play
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In the model, the number of learning rounds can be defined by either a fixed number or by convergence of the mean estimate (within some specifiable error rate) to the true mean of the proportion of nice and nasty strategy types within the population.
Once the learning period is concluded, the main simulation of interest begins and continues for a fixed number of rounds. 14 In this phase, a round is defined by two actions: the organizational choice of each agent for that round and the actual play in that round. Agents begin each round by calculating their expected utility for joining each type of organization and select the one they calculate will yield the highest return. The expected utility for market interactions is the same as an agent would get in play during the learning phase described above.
Agents can choose to pay the cost to join the network (φ) of a known width (α) and depth (l) of agents with whom she has a history of cooperation in the last number of rounds as defined by memory (m). The expected utility from the network is essentially the likelihood that the player receives information about its current partner that changes its behavior plus the likelihood it does not, less the fee imposed to join the network and gain information (φ). The utility for entering a hierarchy will depend on the proportion of the population in the hierarchy the player will join (θ), weighed against the likelihood of cooperation within the hierarchy (q), the punishment for defection (v) , and the ideal point of the hierarchy (p h ).
After agents choose the organization they will join for that round, the next stage is actual play within each organization. As in the learning phase, agents are randomly paired with another agent for that round. If a player selects the market it plays its fixed strategy.
For non-contingent strategy types (ALLC and ALLD), information from the network is irrelevant, since they play the same move regardless of the type of other agent. By design, such agents never choose to join the network even at zero cost. Since only contingent strategy types (TFT) can potentially benefit from information on other agents, only these agents will consider joining the network. If a TFT agent selects the network, it will query the specified past 14 Unlike some similar ABMs, this model is not evolutionary. Although we exogenously change the population of agents in some simulations, there is no endogenous process of change in agent attributes (other than their beliefs) or the composition of the population. For this reason, the number of iterations at the third stage are often much shorter than in other models. We are interested here mostly in organizational choice given agent attributes and the attributes of the population of agents, not in the superiority of particular strategies or in the stability of cooperation per se. We are, for reasons explained below, currently developing an evolutionary version of the model as well.
cooperators about the agent with whom it has been randomly paired and be given a number [0, 1] representing the probability of cooperation to expect from that partner. If that agent believes the other agent is likely to cooperate (the probability is ≥ 0.5), it will cooperate, otherwise the agent defects. The information returned from the network is treated as equivalent to the agent's own beliefs about the randomly paired agent acquired through direct play. That is, if agent i has no past play with agent j, and it receives a signal from the network that j cooperates 0.7, it will update its belief about j's type to 0.7. Similarly, if i believes on the basis of a single past interaction that j cooperates 1.0 and it receives a signal from the network that j has cooperated with five networked agents at a rate of 0.7, it revises its belief about j to 0.75-weighting its own experience equally with those received from the network. In this way, we assume that all agents are sincere in their reporting and are known to be so by all other agents.
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If the agent chooses to join the hierarchy, its play depends on whether or not it is matched with another player in the hierarchy. If the two players belong to the same hierarchy, the agent will cooperate at the rate that the hierarchy enforces (q). If the agent defects (1-q), it will be punished at the defined level (v). If a player is matched with a player outside of its hierarchy, it will play as if it were interacting in the market.
Following play, real payoffs are calculated as a function of the outcome of play, adjusted for the players' ideal points (k) if the outcome was cooperative, punishments, and fees prescribed by their organizations. Actual payoffs can differ from expected payoffs, but are on average the same.
15 This is an important assumption. If agents lie or even communicate poorly (e.g., perform the kinds of minor distortions familiar to children from the "telephone game"), networks may actually harm rather than increase utility by causing contingent players to engage in bouts of mutual punishment. See Downs, Rocke and Siverson (1986) . In this version of the model, we do not discard or discount redundant responses from the network. Intuitively, in real interactions we often do not know exactly where a friend of a friend received their information about some other actor. Given that the strategy types we examine here are pure, this assumption has no consequence for any of our results. If a strategy type plays C or D probabilistically (as does MIX), redundant responses will lead to biased estimates of the agent's type, although on average beliefs will still converge to the true type.
We are primarily interested here in the organizations selected overall and by specific strategy types under varying parameters and the real payoffs of the agents. Our strategy is to simulate organization choice and payoffs under varying conditions by incrementing the selected parameter values over some range. Incrementing one parameter at a time is roughly equivalent to comparative static predictions in closed form models. Because several parameters are randomly assigned according to specified distributions in the initialization phase, and agents are randomly paired at each round of play in both the learning and organizational phases, no two simulations will be identical. For the results below, unless noted otherwise, we replicate the simulation five times for each increment of each parameter and report the average of the results.
III. Illustrations of the Model
Like others, our ABM "is a way of doing thought experiments" that, because of complex interactions, may have non-obvious conclusions (Axelrod 1997, 4) . We aim to illustrate here the potential of the ABM by briefly summarizing simulations that capture core features of three disparate literatures in political science. Our model reveals theoretical limitations and inconsistencies in existing theories. In the case of transnational networks, for instance, we focus on the information transmission value of networks and find that, at least in our model, networks are self-obsolescing. Some level of uncertainty about other agents is necessary if networks are to endure in the real world, but this is not sufficiently theorized in the existing literature. By highlighting interaction effects and population dynamics, the ABM also offers new explanations for phenomenon absent from purely verbal and even two-player, closed form formal models. In the case of social capital, we show the value of population models in explaining phase shifts in behavior now unexplained in the literature. Finally, the model generates new theoretical insights.
Again, in the social capital literature, we demonstrate how hierarchy is a viable alternative to social networks, and may more accurately characterize modern American society than market interactions. Similarly, in a simple depiction of the emergence of political hierarchy, we not only derive the core logic of Hobbes's Leviathan as an emergent property of the model, but show how hierarchy can be an equilibrium even when the ruler has preferences that are extreme or distant from the mean of society. This produces important insights into the nature of autocratic rule.
Transnational Networks and International Governance
Transgovernmental networks (TGNs) are, Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004, 8-11) with other merchants in the network -in a word, reciprocity -and information sharing on agents among the merchants. 17 These same traits are key to the efficiency of Japan's corporate networks in the modern era (Lincoln and Gerlach 2004) . In their emphasis on information sharing, TENs are essentially similar to TGNs.
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Even though our ABM is not identical to any specific network in these different literatures, it captures the essence of networks as governance structures in its focus on information sharing. Demonstrating much of the promise of transnational networks, our model nonetheless suggests that the conditions under which networks will be preferred to markets and 16 See also Raustiala (2002) , Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2009) . For a related view emphasizing transparency, often through networks, see Florini (2003) . 17 Another well known model, Milgrom, North, and Weingast's (1990) "law merchant," possesses attributes of networks, in its use of strategies of reciprocal punishment, and hierarchy, in its centralized dissemination of information. Their analysis becomes a true network only if the law merchant is depicted as a central node to which all other nodes are directly linked. 18 Transnational advocacy networks are related but slightly different in that the information being shared is not about other members of the network but the states and their practices that are the targets of political change. On TANs, see Keck and Sikkink (1998). hierarchies are contingent and limited. The "sweet spot" in which agents prefer networks over markets and hierarchies, in other words, may be smaller than proponents of networks sometimes suggest.
Many of the comparative static results of the model are straightforward and do not need to be demonstrated here. These results are largely intuitive, and serve to validate some of the model's less obvious insights discussed below. As the cost of joining a network goes down, more agents join a network. As the proportion of agents with contingent strategies in the population increases, the proportion of agents in the network increases as well (given at least some small number of nasty strategy types in the population). Over some ranges of the relevant parameters, in turn, a) the larger the incentives to defect, b) the higher the probability of defection in hierarchy, c) the larger the punishment for defection in hierarchy, and d) the more extreme the preferences of the hierarch, the more likely contingent strategy types will be to choose a network, all else constant. Reversing these comparative static results implies conditions that will not favor networks, including TGNs and TENs, and highlights limits to their superiority relative to other organizational forms.
More counter-intuitively, networks are a self-obsolescing organizational form. In our characterization, agents acquire information about the strategy type and ideal point of another agent directly through interactions or indirectly through the network of agents with whom they have cooperated in the past who have interacted with that agent. Networks are valued for the information about other agents they can provide that is not already possessed by the agent. As agents acquire knowledge of other agents through their own interactions or the network, the value of the network declines. At an extreme, after an agent has interacted with or acquired knowledge through the network about every other agent in the population, the network can return no new information of value to that agent; if there is any cost to belonging to a network, agents will then choose some other organizational form (see Figure 3) . Paradoxically, the larger the network relative to the population-making it more beneficial and attractive in early rounds of the gamethe more quickly it becomes obsolete.
Figure 3 about here
The self-obsolescing nature of networks highlights a necessary condition for their persistence that is absent in the existing literature on networked governance. Although our model cannot directly assess this claim, at present, it follows that networks survive over long periods of time only when there are exogenous changes in the strategy types or preferences of other agents or endogenous evolutionary processes through which some agents are selected out and replaced by new agents often enough to offset the costs of participating in those networks. By further implication, the greater the uncertainty about other agents, the more likely agents will be to choose networks (and possibly hierarchies) over markets. Importantly, the utility of networks and their survival as organizations are only partly a function of their attributes (width, depth, memory, and cost) and, in the long run, are more a function of the environment in which they operate.
In addition, the larger the population, the less likely networks are to be selected by agents (see Figure 4 ). It might seem that larger populations favor networks as it takes more iterations of the game for agents to acquire direct knowledge of other agents and, therefore, networks are more
valuable. Yet, for networks of a given size, larger populations also mean that the network is less likely to return information useful to the agent about the agent with whom it is randomly paired.
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In very large populations, "small" networks are of little value and, therefore, will not be chosen by agents. This suggests that networks may develop among, say, the functional ministers of relatively small groups of countries, such as the G8, but not among broader groups like the G77 or all UN members. Likewise, networks may function effectively among small groups of traders, like the Maghribi, but not among all traders in a region. When the set of agents with whom a 19 The probability of a network returning a useful reply is
As n increases, the probability falls. In all cases, allowing duplicates (as in Figure 2b ) reduces the probability of a useful response. In the model, we do not adjust the expected utility of networks for redundant responses.
minister, state, or trader may interact is large, the preferred organizational form will be either markets or hierarchy. More generally, the limited value of networks in large populations helps explain why very large numbers of individuals are governed in hierarchies, like states, rather than in more informal, less centralized networks.
Figure 4 about here
Social network theorists often assume that networks "scale up" easily relative to a population, offsetting the size effect just noted. That is, networks can easily add more agents (nodes) to keep up with total population size. This may be true, but it still has unexpected effects on the choice of organizational form. Even if each agent in the network incurs only a small transactions cost in transmitting information to others, aggregate transactions costs will rise exponentially along with network size. In the present ABM, the only cost or fee is that charged to the agent for joining the network. If we treat this as a pro rata share of the social cost, this fee will also increase exponentially with network size. 20 This cost must eventually -and most likely will soon-exceed the difference between the payoffs for mutual cooperation and mutual defection (or even being suckered). Networks may scale, but even so they will not always be preferred. When interacted with the self-obsolescing nature of networks, moreover, the range over which networks will be preferred to markets and hierarchies is quite limited.
In our ABM, networks appear to be fragile. Agents do choose networks, but they are also quick to drop them in favor of the alternative organizational forms. The optimistic expectations of proponents of transnational networks should be treated with a degree of caution. The question is not whether networks substitute for alternative forms of governance but, rather, what are the ranges of conditions under which networks will be selected. These may be more restrictive than they first appear.
Networks and Social Capital
20 In this construction, think of this network fee not just as the cost of requesting information from other members of the network but also as the cost of responding to the requests of others.
In 2000, Robert Putnam published a path-breaking study on the decline of social capital and civic engagement in the United States. For Putnam (2000, 19) , "the core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value." As he elaborates, "social capital refers to connections among individuals -social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them." If social capital is at its core a social network, as Putnam indicates, our ABM may shed light on this sea-change in American society. 21 Indeed, although our model is designed to capture the general effects of organizational forms on cooperation and not specifically to represent Putnam's theory, it nonetheless has important implications for our understanding of the effects of the decline in social capital and the alternatives to social networks.
We can model the decline of social capital within our ABM in three ways, each of which captures slightly different dimensions of Putnam's analysis. First, several of the causes of the decline of social capital identified by Putnam can be represented as an increase in the costs of joining a network (see Figure 5) . Specifically, the pressures of time, money, and suburbanization, and the pull of electronic entertainment, can all be understood as increasing the opportunity costs of networking. As Americans work longer hours to earn more money while commuting longer distances and face more attractive alternatives for their shrinking leisure time, the effort spent building or maintaining social capital has a higher opportunity cost. Our cost of joining a network captures this opportunity cost directly. Figure 5 demonstrates that as the costs of joining a network increase, TFTs leave the network and join the market or hierarchy. As would be expected, those TFTs with relatively pessimistic beliefs about the population -in other words, those agents who believe the population is nastier than do other agents -join the hierarchy rather than the market (t = 78.68, df = 169998, p < 0.0001). This is consistent with Putnam's description 21 Putnam's empirical claim that social capital has declined in the United States is still contested. For an example, see Paxton (1999) . We sidestep this debate and, for purposes of this analysis, accept Putnam's general description as correct. Our interest is more on the theoretical side in clarifying whether his conclusions about the effects of declining social capital actually follow from this theory.
of change in American society over the last decades. As social capital has declined, more transactions occur in the anomic marketplace.
Figure 5 about here Second, the decline of social capital, or the perception of decline, can be represented by increasing the proportion of nasty strategy types in the population (see Figure 6 ). As social capital erodes, individuals perceive others as less trustworthy and less likely to reciprocate cooperation.
In short, they perceive others as less likely to be nice strategy types (either ALLCs or TFTs) and more likely to be nasty types (ALLDs). Although in our model the beliefs of agents will eventually converge on the true distribution of strategy types in the population, for any given agent its beliefs are the product of its "lived" experience of interacting with other agents. This is, we believe, a close analog to the perceptions of individuals about the changing social world they inhabit. As the proportion of nasty strategy types in the population increases, TFTs leave the network, enter the market, and then eventually join the hierarchy. As the proportion of ALLD players increases, the benefit of learning an agent's type eventually becomes less than the cost to join the network. As the population gets very nasty, TFTs enter the hierarchy to protect themselves through centralized enforcement. Interestingly, however, as more TFTs move into the hierarchy, they are still exploited by relatively optimistic ALLD types who play in the market hoping to sucker the TFTs they encounter. The hierarchy enforces cooperation only between agents that are both members, otherwise they play as in the market. Even as more TFTs are joining the hierarchy, the most optimistic ALLD players choose to remain outside the hierarchy in order exploit others (not shown), resulting in lower average payoffs for the TFTs in successively nastier worlds ( Figure 6 , panel b).
Figure 6 about here Finally, the increasing opportunities for interaction with others through both an increasingly integrated national market and declining transportation and communication costs, implicit in Putnam, erode the utility of social capital. While it may be possible to know everyone within a small community -or at least know someone who knows someone who knows the relevant individual -this is increasingly difficult to maintain as individuals are pulled by opportunities outside that community. We can represent this increasing opportunity structure, as above, as an increase in the population of agents (see Figure 4) . We see again the same pattern of an increasing population leading TFTs to leave the network, enter the market, and (for relatively pessimistic TFTs) join the hierarchy.
All three ways of modeling the decline of social capital point in the same direction:
contingent strategy types begin in the network, and then move into the anomic market as predicted by Putnam. Agreeing with the general pattern he outlines, the model nonetheless helps to resolve a key tension in Putnam's analysis. To explain why social capital has declined in the United States, Putnam examines, as we have seen, the effects of longer working hours, suburbanization, electronic media, and other causes. Putnam is restrained in his conclusions on these variables, however, because all appear to be gradual and incremental changes but the decline in civic engagement is sharp and dramatic. All three of our possible representations, on the other hand, have a similar characteristic that supplements Putnam's insights and suggests how incremental changes can produce sudden and significant shifts in network joining. As we incrementally increase network costs (Figure 5 ), the defection rate in the population (Figure 6 ), and population size (Figure 4 ) above some critical threshold, the proportion of TFT agents in the network drops rather dramatically. All three representations thus suggest non-monotonic effects on network membership that produce a phase shift brought on by very small changes in the relevant parameters of the model. These effects follow from two characteristics of our agents.
First, all agents of the same strategy type are identical except for their beliefs about the population, accumulated through their unique histories of interaction with other agents, and their ideal points, which are randomly assigned. Exogenous changes in any variable affects these agents in similar ways, bounded only by differences in beliefs and ideal points, and cause similar reactions. Second, in the cases of population size and the proportion of nasty agents in the population, population dynamics interact with individual attributes to magnify the effect of changes on network joining. Putnam is trapped by his serial approach to testing possible causes of the decline of social capital and his implicit assumption of monotonic effects. Even in our simple depiction of a social system, the interactions are sufficient to create discontinuous changes in network membership.
Although resolving this key empirical puzzle, our analysis also suggests that Putnam's alternatives to social networks are drawn too narrowly. Although he is correct to see markets as an alternative to networks, hierarchy is also an option, and increasingly so as network costs, the defection rate in the population, and population size increase. Indeed, if the population is sufficiently nasty, all TFTs will leave the market, where the best they can do is mutually defect or be suckered by ALLD types, for the benefits of centralized enforcement of cooperation. This may be what we are witnessing in the United States today. Accepting Putnam's description of the decline of social capital, we see individuals insulating themselves from opportunism by turning to the centralized, legal enforcement mechanisms of the state. Rather than relying on a personal relationship with a local business owner, for example, bankers today depend upon standardized credit reports, contracts, and legal penalties for breaches. As is frequently observed, the United States has become a significantly more litigious society. One way to interpret this is that networks are being displaced not only by the market but various forms of hierarchy.
The narrowness of Putnam's conception of organizational alternatives is brought into sharper relief in a final set of simulations in which we vary all three representations of social capital at the same time. In Figure 7 , we increase simultaneously population size, the cost of joining the network, and the proportion of nasty players in the population. This captures the decline of social capital in all forms and along all dimensions. The effects here are quite distinct from the single dimension, comparative static results in Figures 4a, 5a , and 6a. As we increase all three parameters concurrently, networks become more robust even though network costs and population are also rising, largely because the population is also nastier and agents benefit from knowing more about possible partners. In short, the nastiness of the population mitigates but does not completely offset the effects of network costs and population size. Even so, TFTs will eventually leave the network. More important, in our view, is the dramatic increase in the proportion of TFTs that enter the hierarchy. In the single dimension simulations, most agents left the network for the market, with only the most pessimistic TFTs joining the hierarchy as population size and network costs increased and TFTs as a whole joining the hierarchy only as the population got very nasty. When we increment all three parameters simultaneously, hierarchy becomes the dominant organizational form at lower values of each parameter. In a large, nasty population in which joining networks is costly, virtually all TFTs quickly join the hierarchy. The interactive effects of our three representations of the decline of social capital strongly drive agents away from markets and networks and into hierarchies. If such interactive processes are at work in the United States today, this may explain why and how "small town" America has given way so dramatically to a legalized form of enforcement over the last generation. Putnam clearly expects a world of markets to produce less welfare for individuals and society than a world of social networks. It not just nostalgia that leads him to highlight the virtues of social capital, but a fear that markets or, by our extension, hierarchy will leave all less well off than in the past. Our single dimensional results, however, suggest the welfare effects of different organizational forms may be neutral. As shown in Figures 4b, 5b , and 6b, average payoffs for TFT strategy types tend to remain relatively flat as population size and network costs increase and agents leave the network for the market; only in the case of increasing defection rates do net payoffs unambiguously decline (discussed in more detail in the following section). In the ABM, agents optimize given their strategy types, which are fixed, and their beliefs, which evolve over the course of play. As each of these parameters increase, some TFT types leave the network for the market. In doing so, they no longer pay a cost for joining the network, increasing their net returns, but in turn do slightly worse in actual plays of the game. Without the information on other agents, they are more likely to be suckered by nasty players. What they save by not paying to join the network they lose by lower actual payoffs in the game. On net, however, these TFT types do about as well on average as they did when they were in the comparatively smaller or cheaper network. Perhaps most counter-intuitively, relatively pessimistic TFT types who leave the network and join the hierarchy do better on average than other TFTs in large populations ( Figure 4b ) and about the same as other TFTs at higher levels of network costs (Figure 5b ). With all other TFTs in the market, pessimistic TFTs in the hierarchy play the optimistic TFTs on the same terms and earn, on average, the same returns, while cooperating at relatively high levels with one another and the ALLD types within the hierarchy.
Our multi-dimensional results tell a substantially different story about net welfare. As illustrated in the graphs in the right hand column of Figure 7 , net payoffs to TFTs in the market do decline dramatically as all three dimensions of social capital are simultaneously increased, as
Putnam would expect. Once TFTs join the hierarchy, however, their net payoffs are substantially higher than those realized even in the network when social capital is relatively abundant (by our representations). In this increasingly large and nastier world in which joining networks is becoming more costly, TFTs flee to the hierarchy and are significantly better off than beforeexcept in the nastiest of worlds where the few remaining TFT agents are nearly always exploited by the now hegemonic ALLDs. The welfare benefits of hierarchy are clearly inconsistent with
Putnam's expectations about the effects of declining social capital.
In Section IV of the book, Putnam describes a variety of ways in which the welfare of Americans has declined as social capital has decayed. Our analysis suggests that agents may be no worse off on net than in a world with greater social capital. Participating in a network is costly.
Hours spent in a bowling league cultivating social ties and trust are hours not spent doing something else -including time with one's family or possibly acquiring greater human capital.
Once the costs of participating in social networks are factored into welfare calculations, net payoffs in markets may not be so different (in single dimensions). Moreover, in worlds with very little social capital, depicted here in the multi-dimensional simulation where all three representations of social capital are manipulated at once, agents are driven into the hierarchy where they are then subject to punishment for defecting on other members of the hierarchy, thereby creating a virtuous circle that leaves members better off, paradoxically, that they are in worlds with more social capital. The alternatives to social networks are not only a "Hobbesian" market of declining of cooperation, but also a civil society governed by a ruler who enforces mutually beneficial cooperation under the threat of punishment.
Hobbesian Hierarchy, or Why Don't Men Rebel?
Hierarchy is ubiquitous in social life. It has been explained as an innate characteristic of individuals or societies (Michels 1966 , Dumont 1980 , Sidanius and Pratto 1999 , a function of initial social inequalities (Diehl 2000 , Godelier and Strathern 1991 , Sahlins 2000 , a form of socially constructed power relations (Gramsci 1971 , Foucault 1977 , Barnett and Duvall 2005 , or an institutional solution to collective action and contracting dilemmas (Coase 1937 , 1960 , Williamson 1975 , 1985 . These different conceptions, in turn, have been used to explain the rise of social stratification in general, the origins and structure of firms, the nature and structure of political parties, and the origins and functions of the state (see Lake forthcoming).
Our ABM suggests an approach in which hierarchy is explained as an equilibrium of many egoistic actors. As already indicated in the discussion of social capital, given a sufficiently nasty population, agents join a hierarchy and submit to its possible punishments in order to secure the benefits of cooperation it facilitates. By enforcing cooperation between agents, hierarchy improves their expected utility such that they chose to subordinate themselves to third party rule.
Our ABM is, in some ways, a computational representation of Thomas Hobbes' classic argument for Leviathan. The larger the exogenous probability of defection and the larger the punishments for defection, the more "reluctant" agents are to join the hierarchy. But given a sufficiently nasty population, agents of all types will eventually subordinate themselves to hierarchy. Nonetheless, the model has several surprising implications.
First, counter-intuitively, as a population becomes nastier, it is the nicer types of agents that join the hierarchy first, and the nastiest types who join last (see Figure 8a) . A naïve expectation might posit that the ALLD agents would join the hierarchy first, as this is the only way they can escape mutual defection with one another and informed TFTs. However, there is another, countervailing process occurring simultaneously. Left to otherwise fend for themselves in the market, ALLC types are increasingly exploited by ALLDs as the latter increase as a proportion of the population. ALLCs join the hierarchy not because they are uncooperative players but precisely because they no longer have sufficient opportunities to interact with other cooperative agents. TFT types draw upon the information in the network and then their own knowledge of other agents to protect themselves from being suckered by ALLD types. Less vulnerable to exploitation, TFTs "hold out" until the population gets even nastier but eventually join the hierarchy as well. In contrast to the naïve expectation, ALLDs are the last type of agent to join the hierarchy because they benefit from exploiting others in the market. In the end, for at least some ALLDs in our simulations, the benefits of defecting on the ALLCs outweigh the gains they would otherwise get from cooperating under hierarchy.
Figure 8 about here
As expected in an increasingly nasty world in which some but not all of the ALLD types join the hierarchy, net payoffs decline on average for all agents (see Figure 8b) . Even as the ALLCs, TFTs, and the more pessimistic ALLDs join the hierarchy, they are still being exploited in the market by the more optimistic ALLD types, dragging down the net payoffs for all types of agents. Although Hobbes was correct that individuals subordinate themselves to the Leviathan to escape the state of nature, it is not clear that at least an incomplete civil society improves overall welfare, even for the opportunistic actors who prey on their nicer counterparts in the market. The existence of third party enforcement for some actors does not necessarily allow actors to escape entirely the low-level equilibrium of exploitation or mutual defection in the market.
Second, the ABM also explains why hierarchies can be stable over long periods. By design in the ABM and by analogy to the real world, within a hierarchy agents do not learn anything about the strategy types or ideal points of other agents in the hierarchy. If both are in the hierarchy and agent j cooperates with agent i, i cannot learn whether j cooperated because it "wanted to" or did so only under threat of punishment. Having joined the hierarchy because it believed the population was sufficiently nasty, i then has fewer opportunities to revise its beliefs.
Perversely, given these fewer opportunities, agent i will actually develop more skewed beliefs that lead it, over subsequent rounds, to believe the population is nastier than it really is, reinforcing its initial choice of hierarchy. Unable to learn from others in hierarchy, agent i nonetheless continues to interact with randomly paired others in the market and, as we see in Figure 8 , these others are likely to be disproportionately nasty, leading i to update its beliefs with increasing bias. In this way, agents and, in the real world, individuals get locked into hierarchy and become complicit in the perpetuation of their own subordination. This lock-in effect becomes stronger as the world becomes increasingly nasty and with the proportion of other agents also in the hierarchy.
These results hold, at varying parameter values, for all hierarchies. Yet, the equilibrium nature of hierarchy may be most counter-intuitive when the hierarchy is autocratic, or when the hierarch has an ideal point that is "extreme" within the population and, by analogy, cannot stay in power simply because he reflects broadly shared preferences. Autocracy is one of the great unexplored frontiers of political science. Although there are many insightful and informative case studies, they have largely failed to cumulate into a theory that explains when autocracies are likely to arise and why they persist as often and as long as they do. General theories of autocracy, to the extent that they exist, fall into at least one of three approaches. The first treats autocracy as a default condition or almost a natural state that itself requires no real explanation. Rather, analysis focuses on the fragile nature of democracy and the determinants of successful democratic transitions (see Przeworski 1991 and Przeworski et al. 2000) . Autocracy is simply the null condition. A second approach, exemplified by the selectorate model of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), focuses on the means by which a ruler satisfies a minimum winning coalition of those with political power in order to stay in office. How the selectorate succeeds in deterring challenges or even revolution "from below" is left implicit. 22 A third approach posits that the masses who might otherwise rebel are repressed by the coercive power of the state (see Wintrobe 1998) . In this view, the autocratic ruler is essentially illegitimate and stays in power only through his (or her) control over the police and military. Successful autocrats divide and conquer the subject population to thwart collective action, promote false ideological and normative appeals to persuade individuals that others support the government, and repress dissidents who might otherwise rally the masses to stand up to the regime.
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Our model, however, suggests that autocracy can be an equilibrium created by the cooperation it facilitates when levels of distrust within the population are high. In Figure 9 , agents and especially the ALLC strategy types join the hierarchy unless its ideal point is very far from the median. In this model individuals choose not to exit the hierarchy or "rebel" -and indeed, voluntarily subordinate themselves to a hierarchy even with extreme preferences --because the coercive power of the state is believed to be the only mechanism for ensuring cooperation in a sufficiently nasty population. This implies that autocracy is most likely when many individuals believe others will exploit them or do not trust one another to cooperate in market or even networked exchanges. In other words, hostile environments in which agents are sincerely nasty or believed to be nasty are most likely to be organized as autocracies. This further implies that autocratic hierarchs drive wedges between individuals and groups not to suppress collective action, as traditionally understood in the notion of divide and conquer, but to exacerbate the lack of trust otherwise necessary for self-enforcing cooperation in markets or networks.
Figure 9 about here
This insight about the utility of hierarchy in sufficiently nasty populations has broad application not only to autocracies but to the relationship between state weakness and ethnic polarization as well as lawless environments and criminal and terrorist organizations. Any environment in which the population is sufficiently nasty and cannot be counted on to reciprocate cooperation voluntarily will tend to be organized hierarchically, even when the hierarch is not representative of the policy preferences of society.
Conclusion
Like all theories and models, ABMs are only as useful as the empirically supported, nonobvious propositions they generate. In this article, we limit our empirical applications to the established work of others. 24 The obvious propositions generated by the model largely serve to validate our ideal types of markets, hierarchies, and networks and, equally, our implementation.
The non-obvious propositions show the promise of the ABM and, especially, the value in studying population dynamics. Striking in our view, is the self-obsolescing nature and limited utility of networks in large populations. To our minds, the biggest "surprise" of the model is that as the population becomes nastier, agents of all types are more likely to enter the hierarchy and, furthermore, more cooperative types will enter the hierarchy before less cooperate types. Possibly obvious once stated, this was certainly not a proposition that we anticipated before developing the basic architecture of the model. Indeed, it was not until we ran the model and saw this consistent pattern that we understood the exploitation that occurs in the market and explains this result. 24 In future runs of the model, we want to extend the multidimensional experiments displayed in Figure 7 in order to study population dynamics in more detail. The differences between Figures 4-6 and Figure 7 indicate that the interaction effects between parameters can have enormous implications for organizational choice and stability. We also want to introduce multiple hierarchies with varying attributes and especially ideal points at different points along the range of possible preferences and study when and why they "succeed" in attracting more members. This might offer further insights into "competitive" organizational environments.
Building off a relatively simple conceptualization of cooperation has produced new and, we think, important insights into the conditions under which networks are preferred governance structures. These insights, we believe, reveal assumptions about networks left implicit in existing literatures on networks and social capital. This same conceptualization offers a fresh if somewhat disturbing perspective on the equilibrium nature of hierarchy in sufficiently nasty populations and provides a new explanation for the emergence and persistence of autocracy.
A key but also unexpected finding of the model is that different organizational forms will often co-exist across a broad range of parameter values. That is, different agents (even of the same strategy type) will join markets, hierarchies, or networks at sufficient rates to sustain multiple forms of organization at the same time. Indeed, it is only under relatively extreme values of the parameters that one organizational form will ever triumph over the others. This suggests that research ought to shift, first, from assessing the superiority of markets, hierarchies, and networks to determining superiority for whom, when, and why and, second, from organizations to organizational ecologies so as to understand how different forms complement, compete, and survive in different populations and environments.
Appendix
This appendix defines and explains the expected utility calculations that agents make when deciding to join a market, hierarchy or network. In addition to the user defined parameters summarized in Table 1 , agents are defined by their probability of cooperation (γ), which is either fixed (ALLC γ = 1 and ALLD γ = 0) or variable (TFT γ = 0 or 1). For purposes of calculating an agent's expected utility (as opposed to the actual payoffs defined above in the text), k = w(|p i -|/2), where  is the agent's belief (continuously updated) about the mean ideal point of the population. For the hierarchy, k ih remains as in the text.
In addition, the following endogenous variables are created and updated as the simulation unfolds: β = the agent's belief about the cooperation rate of the population σ = proportion of the population the agent has not already played
For each agent i:
Expected Utility in the Market:
Expected Utility in the Hierarchy: 
Agents choose that organization with the highest expected utility in each round. Actual payoffs may differ from expected payoffs for any individual agent, but on average will be equal. . Agent 1 polls up to three other agents with whom it has cooperated in the last m number of rounds, who poll up to three other agents with whom they have cooperated in the last m number of rounds, who poll up to three other agents with whom they have cooperated in the last m number of rounds whether they have ever played the agent with whom Agent 1 is randomly paired. In a 3x3 network, Agent 1 will receive a maximum of 39 responses (depending on the number of agents each agent has cooperated with in the past m rounds). The larger the width or depth of a network, the more responses Agent 1 will receive. In addition, as each agent can only poll those agents with whom it has cooperated in the last m rounds, the more cooperative the population the greater the number of responses Agent 1 will receive, on average.
Panel b.
A hypothetical network with limited memory and redundant pathways. Agents polled need not be unique as in Figure 1a , and in a finite population most likely will not be (as an agent at level 1 may well be an agent at level 2 or 3 in another branch of the tree). In a population with limited numbers of cooperators and a short memory, it is unlikely that agents will cooperate with more than a small number of other agents. In this case, the number of unique responses is likely to be quite small. A hypothetical network illustrates this point. Levels correspond to those in panel 1a. In this example, Agent 1 would receive a total of eight responses but only 5 unique responses). . 6 . 8
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